Jewels of Allah: The Untold Story of Women in Iran Read online

  While in 1910 there were approximately 3,500 students enrolled in the country’s existing schools, by 1930 there were 150,000 students in all elementary and secondary schools throughout the country, 35,000 of whom were girls.9 Although such progress was indeed stunning, many thousands of boys and girls were not attending the new schools. For one thing, the majority of these schools were concentrated in urban areas. Lack of transportation and teacher reluctance to venture into remote regions of the country meant that students in rural areas were essentially overlooked.

  As part of the country’s growing need for skilled workers, the practice of sending students abroad was made possible by a government decree requiring the Ministry of Education to dispatch a minimum number of students annually to Europe and the United States. During this period, a total of 640 students, out of which 50 were young women, studied abroad. However, not one of these ladies was Muslim.10

  Perhaps Reza Shah’s most drastic measure concerning the female population—one that unintentionally impacted female education—was the abolition of the veil. In 1935, the Pahlavi government decreed that women were no longer allowed to wear the veil. With the momentous new law, Iran became the second Muslim nation, preceded only by Turkey, to officially ban this traditional female garment.11 Girls were also banned from wearing the chador (an ankle-length shroud) and the head scarf in school, punishable by withholding diplomas for all pupils, while instructors who wore the head scarf or veil could lose salaries.12 This profound departure from centuries of ingrained tradition was viewed by Reza Shah to be a fundamental prerequisite in facilitating female inclusion into modern society. He defended his controversial decision with these words:

  The 1935 Abolition of the Veil

  Because of our women’s custom to wear the veil, due to this ignorance and illiteracy, the Europeans have always taunted and despised us. Discarding the veil and educating women would change that.13

  What did this mean for girls who came from traditional religious backgrounds? Modesty and cultural prejudice prevented most conservative families from allowing their daughters to acquire an education in this newly secular atmosphere. Unaccustomed to such radical changes, the majority simply did not allow their daughters to go to school—or to appear in public—without the proper covering. And since the veil was now officially prohibited, their school-age daughters could not be part of the new educational directives. Vehemently opposed to the new unveiling law, religious families thus kept their daughters at home. Ironically, the new policies that allowed thousands of girls to get an education also resulted in keeping thousands more out of school—and behind closed doors at home.

  Freeing for some and oppressive to others, the unveiling crusade (known as Kashf-e-Hejab) was enforced with a single-minded severity not associated with the modern notion of liberation. For example, women who wore the hijab were not allowed in movie theaters, and bus drivers were fined if they accepted veiled women as passengers. While the police were ordered not to resort to violence in getting women to remove their veils in public, there were occasional instances of authorities resorting to beating a woman or removing her veil by force. This typically occurred in cities; due to their remote location, rural communities were less impacted by such drastic measures.14

  In her memoir, Reza Shah’s daughter, Ashraf Pahlavi, reflects on her father’s decision to ban the veil:

  [He was] determined to westernize Persia … to bring it into the twentieth century.… To do this, to make us prosperous and powerful, he could not afford to leave out women, half of Persia’s population, inactive, covered.15

  Given his groundbreaking proclamation, one would assume that Reza Shah celebrated the unveiling of his own wife and daughter. However, Ashraf Pahlavi’s recollections disclose the personal struggle her father experienced. Requesting that they appear without the hijab at the 1936 graduation ceremony of the women’s Teacher Training College in Tehran, Reza Shah admitted:

  This is the hardest thing I have ever had to do, but I must ask you to serve as an example for other Persian women.16

  Historians maintain that “while reaction to the state’s coercive measure differed from class to class and region to region,” unveiling became “in the mind so of many Iranians, the point of women’s awakening and the cause of their resentment towards Reza Shah.”17 Ironically, this seemingly liberating measure had the opposite effect for a large segment of the female population that was unaccustomed to going out in public without the proper head covering. Stifled by this new policy, they remained in seclusion, relying instead on their fathers, husbands, and sons.

  January 1935—Reza Shah Pahlavi and daughters leaving the Royal Palace on the day when the chador (“veil”) was officially prohibited.

  While the unveiling law resulted in many Iranian girls being kept out of school by their parents, others were able to benefit from the expanding educational opportunities afforded by the Pahlavi regime. The inauguration of new schools for girls, coeducational facilities, and the Teacher Training College, along with the extension of primary schooling and technical and vocational institutions, were instrumental in the push toward expanding educational opportunities for women.18 By 1935, despite unrelenting prejudice by the religious establishment, an official decree by the Ministry of Education led to the increased presence of young women in academia. Women were admitted to the University of Tehran in 1935 for the first time, and in 1936, women were admitted for the first time to the newly established Tehran Teachers’ College.19 Isa Sadiq, founding member of the University of Tehran and possibly the most influential reformer in twentieth-century Iran, declared:

  In 1935, women were admitted for the first time to the University of Tehran.

  The education for girls is an important duty (“vazife”) of the government, which is likely to launch Iran on the path to westernization and progress (“tarraqi”).20

  TOO MUCH, TOO SOON

  Not surprisingly, there were objections from the orthodox establishment against the campaign for female literacy, prompting the Speaker of the Parliament to declare:

  Women’s studies should be in line with the tasks they are supposed to perform in society. We must ask, why do we send girls to school? The answer is to enable them to take better care of their children, be better housekeepers.… Why do girls have to learn mathematics? We should teach them cooking and sewing instead.21

  There was no denying that a majority of the traditional population, as well as the clerical establishment, resented such drastic changes. The clergy were not only deprived of their stronghold in the school system, but many of the newly established secular laws reduced their overall power in the academic sector after centuries of control.

  Exacerbating matters was the introduction of legal codes based on European models. For example, the enactment of the Marriage Law (Qanun-e Ezdevaj) of 1931, mandating compulsory registration of marriage and divorce in state notary offices, limited jurisdiction of the clergy in judicial matters.22 Such revolutionary measures led author Nikki Keddie to conclude, “Rapid modernization from above helped create two cultures in Iran, which became more acute in later decades.”23

  For the first time since the advent of the Safavid Dynasty in the sixteenth century, the relationship between the monarchy and the clerical establishment was strained. Once Reza Shah embarked on a more secular path, the religious echelon no longer played the lead role. Furthermore, the more conservative clergy were vehemently opposed to any and all social changes attributed to the West—considered a violation of true Islam and incompatible with the intrinsic nature of Iranian society. Religious leaders as well as a large segment of Iran’s traditional population deeply resented the image of the “emancipated” Iranian woman. They were unable to accept or relate to such drastic overnight changes.

  In the overall assessment of Reza Shah’s sweeping changes, it is important to note that despite such reforms, he was a devoutly religious man. Nonetheless, he believed that the clergy were thwarting progress in Iran. Alt
hough I contend that he was absolutely correct, it is my belief that he should have allowed his agenda to evolve more gradually. Given the country’s religious backbone and deep adherence to faith, the new Pahlavi policies were definitely a case of too much, too soon.

  In evaluating the new direction undertaken by the monarch, historians have held diverse viewpoints, with some questioning Reza Shah’s religiosity and others rationalizing his policies as simply a desire to dispense with what he believed to be an outdated system that needed to evolve. Renowned authors and historians Shireen Mahdavi and David Menashri provide additional perspectives on this subject.

  Mahdavi believes that, like many enlightened intellectuals, Reza Shah envisioned the compatibility of Islam with more progressive measures, while Menashri counters that the monarch appeared “more anti-clerical than anti-Islamic, but [that] such a distinction is alien to Islam, which rejects the sacredness of the temporal and the spiritual. This [in turn] implied reducing the influence of the ulama (clergy) in all spheres of life and confining them to matters of faith and ritual, similar to that customary in the Christian West at the time.”24

  In fact, the following statement by Reza Shah’s son and successor, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, provides support for Menashri’s assessment: “[He] never advocated a complete break with the past; he pushed the clergy into the background because at the time many of them were hindering the country’s progress.”25

  As is often the case when swift and radical change rocks the boat, not everyone wants to remain on board. Those with traditional, conservative values chose to adhere to the dictates of the clergy, as Reza Shah’s transformative decrees constituted a foreign way of life for the sheltered masses. Author Eliz Sanasarian underscores the difficulty in “preaching equal rights to a female population with an illiteracy rate of 95%.”26 On the other hand, women (and men) largely from urban areas and from the upper and upper middle classes enthusiastically welcomed the progressive policies. Author Azar Tabari provides an interesting overview regarding what historians believe was a growing divide between women during the Pahlavi era.

  The professional women of the 1920s and 1930s were mostly from the upper middle class.… [They] largely accepted and adapted to the changes and the secularization imposed by Reza Shah. [They] emerged from the social layers that identified with general notions of social progress and modernization associated with European civilization and endorsed by the modernists and reformers of the Constitutionalist Movement.…27

  SPREADING THE WORD

  As part of the regime’s overall objective of bringing women out of centuries of seclusion and into mainstream society, formal education was essential. So was connecting with other like-minded women in a new era of expanded opportunities—and women’s magazines and organizations were viewed as instrumental in this endeavor.

  A number of independent women’s publications flourished in the immediate aftermath of Reza Shah’s rise to power. Alam-e Nesvan (Women’s Universe, 1920–1934) was the frontrunner in supporting the state’s female agenda. Throughout its years of publication, Alam profiled various professions suited to the unveiled Iranian woman, as well as European role models, lifestyles, and perspectives. A bimonthly publication with semi-independent status, it published such impassioned editorials as this one decrying misogynistic marital practices and women’s illiteracy, and endorsing the new government:

  Are we aware that whenever they want to, men can throw their wives out of the house? Are we aware that women’s illiteracy, lack of knowledge, and superstitions are harmful to society, the country, and the family? Do we know that in villages people illegally marry off a ten-year-old girl to a sixty-year-old man? Today, we have a government that listens to sensible argument and protects women and children.28

  In fact, in 1931 the new Marriage Law stipulated that the minimum marriage age would be increased from thirteen to fifteen— which may not seem wildly significant to twenty-first-century Westerners, but it signaled progress in 1930s Iran. Alam’s reference to illegally marrying off a child to an old man highlights the publication’s support for the state’s progressive agenda for women and its belief that Reza Shah’s regime was proceeding in the right direction.

  Alam was the longest running women’s journal until it was abruptly terminated in 1934 for unspecified reasons. Over the years, there has been speculation regarding the closure of the magazine, leading to the conclusion that perhaps an article published in 1933 too ominously denounced the unveiling of women as a superficial emblem of emancipation. The author of that article spoke out:

  A group of people including myself believe that the removal of the chador [veil] will not create freedom nor will hejab [veil] prevent moral corruption.…29

  In 1935, Kanoon-e Banovan (Ladies Center) was established.

  Once Reza Shah was firmly in power, women’s independent activities were curbed and by royal command directed and regulated into a single organization. In 1935 Kanoon-e Banovan (Ladies Center) was established as the primary vehicle to promote the regime’s preferred image of the modern Iranian woman. Two of Reza Shahs’s daughters, Ashraf and Shams, were involved in the center, which additionally organized lectures, adult classes, and sports clubs for women.30 In 1937, Sadiqeh Dowlatabadi, a leading pioneer of the early women’s movement, was appointed president of the center.31

  Paradoxically, under the regime of Reza Shah, the women’s organizations and magazines that had begun to emerge in the teens and early twenties declined on many fronts, leaving room only for a women’s movement dictated by the Pahlavi monarchy.

  EDUCATION WILL STEER THE SHIP

  Reza Shah’s son and successor, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, came to power in 1941—after the invasion of allied forces during World War II—and continued “the vigorous reform program inaugurated by his father.”32 In reality, the monumental reforms instigated by Reza Shah had primarily impacted the urban population, and only a predominantly cultured, progressive-minded and privileged few had been able to capitalize on the new employment and educational opportunities. For example, only 1 percent of Iran’s total school-aged population was enrolled in elementary schools upon Reza Shah’s departure. Meanwhile, such developments were essentially invisible to the majority of conservative Iranians, who resented the Pahlavi regime for, in their view, obstructing the sacred codes of Islamic tradition.

  In the over 50,000 villages that constituted rural Iran, a number of factors stood in the way of educational progress. Most importantly, as citizens of a primarily agricultural nation, parents did not consider education a priority; rather, they viewed their children as part of the family’s workforce. Lack of transportation and modern amenities in the rural areas, a shortage of instructors, and insufficient economic resources also contributed to the challenge.

  Nonetheless, Reza Shah’s equally ambitious heir was committed to taking his father’s reforms to the next level. The extraordinary reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was characterized by rapid urbanization, banning of the Communist Tudeh Party33 in Iran, nationalization of Iranian oil, development of a modern military, expansion of the existing educational infrastructure, and considerable reforms for women.34

  The devastation of World War II had led the Shah to seek assistance from the United States, which as part of the allied war effort had begun to take a more active role in alleviating the ravages of a damaged nation.35 The post-war phase additionally resulted in the temporary revival of British involvement in Iran, which had significantly subsided toward the end of Qajar rule. The assistance provided by the governments of these two countries was instrumental in alleviating Iran’s faltering economy.36 Over the following decade, U.S. involvement surpassed that of the British, as the 1941 Lend-Lease Act and the 1949 Point Four Program provided aid and technical support, mainly in agriculture, public health, and education, and primarily through contact with U.S. business and educational institutions.37

  In subscribing to the principle that “all modernizing nations need a plan of action,” the
regime resorted to the services provided by American consultants in the formulation and launching of the country’s First Seven-Year Plan (1948–1955).38 The plan, which included programs in health, agriculture, education, mining, and oil production, was an instant failure due to the shortage of funds, administrative constraints, and political disruptions.

  With the gradual rise in oil revenues, the government embarked on implementing the Second Seven-Year Plan (1955–1962), which once again proved ineffective due to its “vagueness” and “absence of specific time-targets.”39 In 1957, a planning unit supported by the Harvard Advisory Group was incorporated within the plan organization, leading to the country’s Third National Development Plan (1962–1968). This plan combined investment programs with forecasts in the public and private sector and specific tasks for ministerial and government agencies, in addition to a twenty-year collaborative program with international experts providing specialized attention in the field of education.40

  In the Fourth National Development Plan (1968–1972), qualitative enhancements and structural changes outlined in the “principles” and “objectives” of education specified compatibility of this infrastructure with “modern scientific and educational progress and the requirements of modern times.”41 A significant component of this agenda entailed specialized teacher training programs for girls, specifically since “the total number of girls in Iranian schools did not exceed 1/3 of the total number of pupils.” It effectively led to reduced illiteracy and an increase in the number of students at the primary and secondary levels.42